

TOP SECRET

28 May 1963

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Comments on State Memorandum of 27 May on Possible Soviet Initiatives to End US Aerial Reconnaissance

1. *Changed*
~~This is generally a good paper.~~ In our view, the Cuban and Soviet regimes have reluctantly reconciled themselves, for the present, to continued high-level overflights. So long as they give priority to the task of gradually consolidating Cuba's position and winning *a policy they apparently now intend to follow for some time* de facto acceptance of its status, they are unlikely to mount major initiatives against the present reconnaissance program. Nevertheless, we do not expect this toleration to continue indefinitely, and contingencies like those discussed in the State memorandum ~~will~~ *may* sooner or later arise.

2. The memorandum presents six courses of action which the Communists might initiate, explores the problems which each would pose for the US, and suggests *some* appropriate US responses. A summary and our comments follow.

a. A Cuban effort to force the UN to require that the US cease overflights. The paper suggests that the US defense be based on the Q45 resolution of 23 October and Cuban failure to allow ground inspection. It concludes that this gambit holds little promise for the Communists, *would not lead to desired action in the vote.*

Comment: We agree with this however feel that this

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

b. Cuban recourse to the International Court of Justice.

The paper concludes that Cuba is unlikely to accept compulsory adjudication by the ICJ but that, if it did, we would be in trouble, *on purely negotiable grounds -* although we could initiate counter-suits.

c. Soviet pressures elsewhere, such as Berlin, which would be linked to US overflights and relaxed in return for cessation of reconnaissance. The paper views this primarily as a gambit to stimulate our European allies to urge us to end overflights. It concludes that the USSR would not expect much success in this effort. COMMENT: We think that such a tactic would be aimed directly at the US, rather than indirectly through its allies. We also conclude that it is unlikely in the near future, but for the different reason that, in the Soviet view, it would carry substantial risks of its own and *out of proportion* would be unlikely to induce the US to cease overflights.

to what is at stake in overflight

d. A private Soviet offer to withdraw all military personnel from Cuba in exchange for US cessation of overflights. The paper concludes that, although the Soviets do not want to admit the negotiability of their forces in Cuba, this is a possible gambit. It recommends that the US insist that the quid pro quo for overflights is ground inspection, not the Soviet *military* presence. COMMENT: We think this Soviet approach is quite unlikely, not only for the reason cited, but because the Soviets would have no guarantee that the US, in response to some future intelligence crisis, would hold to the bargain. They would foresee that

TOP SECRET

it would be infinitely easier for the US to resume overflights than for them to return their forces to Cuba.

e. Cuban proposal that the US cease overflights in return for ground inspection in Cuba and elsewhere, such as Florida and various Caribbean territories. The paper concludes that this tactic would not hold much promise for the Cubans and would pose no major problems for the US. *Might be used to cover the flank*

f. Cuban reconnaissance, assisted by the USSR, of a Central American country to lay the groundwork for a proposal of mutual cessation of overflights. The paper does not judge the likelihood of this course of action. It points out that, if the US opposed Cuban overflights, the Cuban case in a subsequent UN appeal would be strengthened. COMMENT: We believe that the Soviets and Cubans would regard a program of overflights in Central America as very risky and likely to set in motion a crisis which would offer the US new pretexts for invasion.

3. We believe that the US ought to consider yet another Soviet/Cuban course of action, in which initiatives against overflights are taken in conjunction with the turnover of the SAM system to Cuban forces. USIB has estimated that such a turnover might occur as early as the latter part of 1963. If the Soviets decided to do this, they would clearly wish to minimize the danger of subsequent crises arising from a U-2 shootdown, and the surest way to do this would be to achieve a *price*

TOP SECRET

cessation of overflights. Accordingly, as turnover approached, they might begin to issue private warnings to this effect to the US and to UN members and to mobilize pressure upon the US with the threat of an impending aerial confrontation after the SAM system passed into Cuban hands.

4. In any of the diplomatic/propaganda initiatives which the Soviets and Cubans might undertake against overflights, Communist spokesmen would agitate the general issue of overflights as an impermissible transgression of sovereignty. In the course of this campaign, they might reveal a great deal of information about U-2 overflights of non-Bloc countries. This suggests that the US ought to be prepared for revelations which would prove embarrassing and might influence the positions adopted by those countries which have been overflown and the generality of nonaligned nations.

TOP SECRET